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January 1967] Recent Developments 
ESTATE TAX-"Disallowance of Double Deductions" in 
I.R.C. Section 642 (g) Applies Only to "Statutory 
Deductions"-Estate of Bray* 
571 
Petitioners, as executors for a substantial estate, had to sell a 
large amount of securities in order to pay administration expenses 
incurred by the estate. The estate received $2,250,000 from this sale, 
which was $50,000 in excess of the value of the stock at the time of 
decedent's death and thus as reported on the estate tax return.1 
The brokerage commissions and taxes on the sale, which totaled 
$23,000, were deducted from the value of the gross estate as adminis-
tration expenses pursuant to section 2053(a)(2) of the 1954 Internal 
Revenue Code.2 The same $23,000 was also subtracted from the 
$50,000 received above the value of the stock at the time of decedent's 
death,3 so that petitioners reported only $27,000 on the estate's in-
come tax return as the gain realized from the sale. The Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue disallowed the use of the brokerage expenses as 
a reduction in computing the estate's taxable income on the grounds 
that a waiver of the right to use these same expenses as an estate tax 
deduction had not been filed in accordance with section 642(g).4 
The Tax Court, overruling the Commissioner, held that the peti-
tioners did not have to comply with section 642(g) which disallows 
double deductions because the brokerage commissions were an off-
set against the selling price of the securities and not a deduction for 
income tax purposes. 
Section 2053 provides that certain expenses associated with the 
• 46 T.C. 577 (1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
1. The dollar amounts have been rounded off and are not therefore the actual 
amounts involved in the case. 
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a) provides in part: 
(a) GENERAL RULE-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the 
value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of 
the gross estate such amounts-
(2) for administration expenses, 
as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the 
United States, under which the estate is being administered. · 
3. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 1014(a) states that the basis of property for estate tax 
purposes is the "value of the property at the date of the decedent's death." 
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 642(g) states: 
(g) DISSALLOWANCE OF DOUBLE DEDUCTIONS-Amounts allowable 
under section 2053 or 2054 as a deduction in computing the taxable estate of a 
decedent shall not be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable income 
of the estate or of any other person, unless there is filed, within the time and in the 
manner and form prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, a statement that the 
amounts have not been allowed as deductions under section 2053 or 2054 and a 
waiver of the right to have such amounts allowed at any time as deductions under 
section 2053 or 2054. This subsection shall not apply with respect to deductions 
allowed under part II (relating to inco:ne in respect of decedents). 
This section was recently amended to include the words "or any other person" after "in 
computing the taxable income of the estate" in the first clause. This addition, however, 
does not affect the principal case. See S. REP. No. 1599, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6 (1966). 
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administration of an estate may be deducted from the value of the 
gross estate in computing the estate tax. Some of the expenses which 
may be deducted for estate tax purposes under section 2053 may 
also be expenses for the production of income, and as such, may 
likewise qualify as deductions on the estate's income tax return 
under the provisions of section 212.5 Expenses that do qualify as 
deductions under both sections are precluded from being deducted 
twice by section 642(g) which requires that a "deduction" be taken 
only once, either on the estate's income tax return or on the estate 
tax return. 6 Brokerage expenses incurred when an estate is forced to 
sell securities are clearly allowed as an administration expense de-
duction on the estate tax return under section 2053.7 For income 
tax purposes, however, brokerage commission expenses of a non-
dealer in securities are not classified as a statutory deduction under 
any section of the Code, but rather have traditionally been con-
sidered an "offset" against gross receipts of sale.8 Thus, the point of 
controversy in the principle case is the applicability of section 642(g) 
to brokerage commissions which, although not true income tax de-
ductions, nevertheless reduce taxable income in a manner similar to 
deductions when such commissions are used as an offset against gross 
receipts. The Commissioner, in Revenue Ruling 56-43,0 held that 
the term "deductions" in section 642(g) is used in a broad sense so 
as to disallow the double use of any item of expense which may 
have the effect of reducing both the taxable estate and the estate's 
taxable income.10 The Tax Court in the principal case, however, 
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-l(i) (1957). 
6. See note 4 supra. An important exception to this prohibition against double 
deductions is deductions in respect of decedents. See generally Ferrari, Jr., Income in 
Respect of a Decedent: Deductions, Capital Gains, and Double Deductions, N.Y.U. 23D 
INST. ON FED. TAX 1209 (1965). 
7. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d) (1965) provides in pertinent part: 
(2) Expenses for selling property of the estate are deductible if the sale is 
necessary in order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes, 
to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution. The phrase "expenses for selling 
property" includes brokerage fees and other expenses attending the sale • • • • 
See Dudley S. Blossom, 45 B.T.A. 691 (1941), dealing with the predecessor to the 
present regulation. 
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-l{n) (1957) states that "capital expenditures are not allowable 
as nontrade or nonbusiness expenses" and thus can not be used as income tax deduc-
tions. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(e) (1958) gives as an example of a capital expenditure: 
Commissions paid in purchasing securities. Commissions paid in selling securities 
are an offset against the selling price, except that in the case of dealers in securities 
such commissions may be treated as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 
The treatment of brokerage commissions as offsets is a long standing practice. See 
G.C.M. 15430, XIV-2 CUM. BULL. 59 (1935); e.g., Spreckles v. Commissioner, 315 
U.S. 626 (1942): Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938). For a discussion of the dis-
tinction between capital expenditures and nonbusiness expenses, see Munson v. 
McGinnes, 283 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1960). 
9. This ruling has been highly criticized. MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES, § 20.16 
(38th ed. 1961); 4 RABKIN &: JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT, & ESTATE TAX § 54.02(7) 
(1966). See generally Bard, The Disallowance to Estates of Double Deductions, 42 
TAXES 455 (1964); Pincus, Expenses of Sale by Estates, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1004 (1956). 
10. 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 210. This ruling states: 
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refusing to recognize this interpretation, agreed with the petitioner's 
contention that the inclusion of offsets within the concept of "de-
duction" as employed in sections 642(g) is not justified. 
This decision finds ample support in both the statutory language 
and the legislative history of section 642(g). The Commissioner 
claimed that the congressional intent in passing section 642(g) was to 
prohibit the "windfall" which resulted when a fiduciary of an estate 
used a single expense from a single economic transaction to reduce 
both the estate's income tax and the taxable estate.11 Thus, although 
a literal reading of the section would not include offsets, the Commis-
sioner contended that, in order to give effect to the congressional 
purpose underlying the provision, the word "deduction" should be 
broadly interpreted. In support of such an interpretation, the Com-
missioner argued that the deductions and offset distinction which is 
used in the part of the Code dealing with the computation of an in-
dividual's income tax should not be carried over into a wholly differ-
ent part of the Code which is concerned solely with prohibiting the 
double use of a single expense by an estate.12 However, section 64l(b), 
states that "the taxable income of an estate or trust shall be computed 
in the same manner as in the case of an individual, except as otherwise 
provided in this part."13 This would seem to indicate that in dis-
allowing double deductions, section 642(g) used the word "deduc-
tion" in the same way as it is used "in the case of an individual," there 
being no language to the contrary. Therefore, brokerage expenses 
incurred by an estate, just as those incurred by an individual non-
dealer, should not be treated as a deduction from gross income but 
rather as an offset against gross receipts in computing gross income.14 
Moreover, the legislative history of the section strongly suggests 
that Congress only intended to prohibit the double use of statutory 
deductions and did not intend to prohibit generally the double use 
of every expense by an estate.15 Congress could have easily used more 
Expenses incurred in the sale of property, other than by a dealer, are considered 
as an offset against the sale price and not deductible as an ordinary and necessary 
business expense. See G.C.M. J5430, C.B. XIV-2, 59 (1935). However, such expenses 
may not be used as an offset against the sale price of property in determining 
gain or loss for Federal income tax purposes where they have already been allowed 
as a deduction for Federal estate tax purposes. Such items of expense fall within 
the concept of section 642(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Although sec-
tion 642(g) of the Code refers to the disallowance of double deductions, it is the 
position of the Internal Revenue Service that such section contemplates the dis-
allowance, as a reduction in computing the taxable income of the estate, of such 
items which have been allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable estate. 
See Rev. Rul. 340, C.B. 1953-2, 79. 
11. First Brief for Respondent, p 11. 
12. Id. at 15. 
13. Emphasis added. Treas. Reg. § I.64l(b)-l (1956), points out that § 641 is subject 
to the special rules found in § 642. 
14. See note 8 supra. See generally Pincus, supra note 9. 
15. The courts have generally narrowly interpreted "deductions" when they have 
been asked to extend the definition. See Charles E. Good, 208 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. 
Mich. 1962); Universal Optical Co., 11 T.C. 608, 621-22 (1948). See Bard, supra note 
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specific language if it had meant to include "offsets" within the 
prohibition of section 642(g).16 The distinction between deductions 
and offsets had been well settled for some time prior to the enact-
ment of section 642(g).17 Indeed, the double use of brokerage com-
mission expenses as an offset for income tax purposes and as a deduc-
tion from the taxable estate had been allowed by one court just a 
year before the section prohibiting double deductions was originally 
enacted.18 Furthermore, when the provision was first under consider-
ation by the House of Representatives there is no question that it 
referred solely to statutory deductions,19 for the House was specifi-
cally concerned with limiting the possibility of double deductions 
by estates, which possibility would arise after the passage of proposed 
section 23(a)(2) (predecessor to section 212 of the present Code) 
allowing, for the first time, certain non-business expenses as income 
tax deductions. 20 The House realized that the proposed allowances 
for non-business expenses would increase the possibility of an estate's 
claiming of double deductions since many of these deductible non-
business expenses were also recognized estate tax deductions.21 Ac-
9, at 460. Furthermore, courts have denied that the Code in general, or § 642(g) in 
particular, expresses an inherent disfavoring of double deductions. See, e.g., Adams v. 
Commissioner, llO F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1940); Brown v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 281 
(10th Cir. 1934); Robert J. Kleberg, 31 B.T.A. 95 (1934); Mary E. Burrow Trust, 39 
T.C. 1080 (1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1964). In Mary E. Burrow Trust, the 
court allowed a double deduction by holding that § 642(g) did not apply to trusts as 
the word "trust" was omitted in that subsection while it was used in the other seven 
subsections of § 642. But see 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 707 (1964). As a result of the decision 
in Burrow's Trust, Congress amended § 642(g) in 1966 so as to include trusts under the 
prohibition of double deductions. See note 4 supra. 
16. Section 642(g) of the 1954 Code was originally § 162(e) of the 1939 Code which 
was added by amendment in 1942. See generally Bard supra note 9. 
17. See, e.g., Adams v. Commissioner, llO F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1940); Brown v. Com-
missioner, 74 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1934); Robert J. Kleberg, 31 B.T.A. 95 (1934). 
18. Dudley S. Blossom, 45 B.T.A. 691 (1941); see principal case at 580 n.l. 
19. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, 76 (1942); see Sutter, Election to 
deduct expenses for estate or income taxes: effective use of 1951 Code, 3. J. TAXATION 
357 (1955). 
20. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212 provides: 
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(!) for the production or collection of income; 
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for 
the production of income; or 
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax. 
This section is substantially unchanged from § 23(a)(2) of the 1939 Code except that 
in 1954 subsection (3) was added. 
21. It should be noted that there was no prohibition against double deductions 
before 1942. See cases cited note 17 supra. However, the only income tax deductions 
that could be taken by an estate were for business expenses, and since most expenses 
incurred in handling an estate were considered nonbusiness expenses, see, e.g., United 
States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127 (1941), the opportunity rarely arose for estates to take 
advantage of the possible double deductions. For this reason, the House of Represen-
tatives was not too concerned with the past use of double deductions. See Don A. 
Davis, 4 T.C. 329 (1944), aff'd, 151 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1945), where the court held that 
the 1942 amendment to the Code was not meant to disturb the traditional use of 
selling commission expenses as offsets. 
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cordingly, the House adopted a provision which said in effect that 
an expense taken as an estate tax deduction could not be allowed as 
a deduction under the new section 23(a)(2) on the income tax re-
turn22 Although the Senate decided to broaden "the somewhat 
narrower provisions" formulated by the House by extending the 
coverage so as to include all deductions allowed under section 23 
and not just those under section 23(a)(2),23 all other language used 
by the House was adopted without change.24 It is reasonable to 
assume, therefore, that the Senate did not intend to change the 
meaning of the House version, but sought only to include a greater 
number of statutory deductions under the prohibition of section 
642(g); it did not intend, in the process, to include anything more 
than statutory deductions. This interpretation is, in fact, coincident 
with the way in which the Internal Revenue Service originally con-
strued and administered the statute as is evidenced by several private 
rulings including a 1952 ruling which declared: 
Therefore, both commissions and stamp taxes are offset against 
gross sales in determining gross income from a sale of securities .•.. 
Accordingly, this office holds that where securities are sold at a gain, 
and the expenses of the sale are offset against the selling price, there 
is no Section 23 [212] deduction involved and hence no application 
of Section 162(e) [642(g)] of the Code.25 
Since this construction of the predecessor to section 642(g) had long 
been established, reenactment of the section by Congress in 1954 
may legitimately be interpreted as legislative sanction of that con-
struction. 26 Although somewhat broader language is used in the 
section as reenacted,27 it is unlikely that Congress meant to define 
more broadly the word "deduction," for not only does the section 
as reenacted still refer merely to deductions, but in addition, the 
Senate Committee reported that the two versions of the section were 
22. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, 76 (1942). 
23. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1942). 
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 162(e), as finally promulgated stated: 
(e) Amounts allowable unde:- section 812(b) as a deduction in computing the 
net estate of a decedent shall not be allowed as a deduction under section 23 
except subsection (w), in computing the net income of the estate unless there is 
filed, within the time and in the manner and form prescribed by the Commis• 
sioner, a statement that the items have not been claimed or allowed as deductions 
under section 812(b) and a waiver of the right to have such items allowed at any 
time as deductions under section 812(b). 
25. Pincus, supra note 9, at 1006. 
26. G.C.M. 15430, XIV-2 CUM. BULL. 59, 60 (1935) declares in pertinent part: 
It is well settled that where a statute has been construed for a long period 
of time as having a certain meaning, a reenactment of that statute without change 
indicates legislative sanction of the construction previously given it. (National 
Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140; New Haven R.R. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361; 
Copper Queen Mining Co. v. Arizona Board, 206 U.S. 474). 
27. Section 642(g) of the present Code (note 4 supra) provides that an expense taken 
as an estate tax deduction "shall not be allowed as a deduction in computing the 
taxable income of the estate," while § 162(e) of the 1939 Code (note 24 supra) stated 
that such expenses "shall not be allowed as a deduction under section 23." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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"comparable."28 Furthermore, as the court in the principal case 
pointed out, substantially the same process is used to compute gain 
for income tax purposes under both the present Code and the 1939 
Code, and it is unlikely Congress meant to treat offsets as deductions 
in section 642(g) of the present Code if they were not so treated in 
its predecessor.29 The reason for the minor change in language is 
not entirely clear, although it probably was added to extend the ap-
plication of the section so as to cover all income tax deductions.30 
The Commissioner's broad interpretation of section 642(g) in 
Revenue Ruling 56-43 was properly repudiated by the court in the 
principal case, and technically it would be difficult to quarrel with 
the decision. The Commissioner, however, presented what appears 
at first blush to be an interesting practical argument against the out-
come by claiming that it would result in inequitable treatment of 
taxpayers.31 It is a well-established policy that taxpayers in similar 
situations should be treated equally, if possible, unless there is an 
express provision in the Code to the contrary.32 The Commissioner 
claimed that if the brokerage commission expenses were allowed to 
be treated as both an income tax offset and an estate tax deduction, 
a disparity of treatment would result between two similarly situated 
taxpaying estates if one realized a capital gain and the other suffered 
a capital loss. Since a capital loss under section 165(c) is considered a 
"deduction" for income tax purposes,33 the Commissioner main-
tained that if brokerage commissions were used as an offset against 
the gross receipts of a sale, the effect in a loss situation would be that 
the amount of the offset would be "added" to the capital loss and 
immediately become part of the allowed statutory "deduction." 
Since it would thus be included as a part of an income tax "deduc-
tion," section 642(g) would apply and would require that the use 
of the commission expense as a deduction from the taxable estate 
be disallowed. Therefore, the Commissioner concluded, if Revenue 
Ruling 56-43 were not followed, section 642(g) would disallow the 
double use of brokerage expenses when there is a capital loss, while 
the estate which realizes a capital gain would obtain a greater tax 
28. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1954). 
29. Principal case at 582. 
30. For example, it would now be impossible to claim that a distribution from the 
income of an estate, which is deductible under § 661, is not within the coverage of 
§ 642(g). See Bard, supra note 9, at 456. 
31. First Brief for Respondent, pp. 16-17. • 
32. E.g., Charles llfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934). 
33. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) GENERAL RULE-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sus-
tained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. 
(c) LIMITATION ON LOSSES OF INDIVIDUALS-In the case of an indi-
vidual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to-
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not con-
nected with a trade or business; and . • • • 
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advantage by being effectively able to use the expense twice.34 Such 
dissimilar treatment of taxpayers, it was argued, should not be 
permitted. 
The fallacy of the Commissioner's argument is that when a 
brokerage expense is used as an offset, it is not subtracted from the 
gross receipts of a sale in order to determine the deduction, but 
rather is added to the basis of the property sold in order to deter-
mine the extent of gain or loss resulting from the sale.35 Thus, in the 
case of a capital loss, it is from the combined total of the basis plus 
the brokerage expenses that the selling price is substracted to deter-
mine the amount of the loss. Although the amount of the brokerage 
expense may be reflected in the total loss as a result of its having 
been added to the basis, the expense is in no way "added" to the 
capital loss in such a way that it becomes a part of the statutory de-
duction.36 Since it is not a part of the loss deduction, there is not a 
double deduction when the selling expense is claimed as a deduction 
from the gross estate. A court, therefore, would be consistent if it 
were to decide a case involving an estate which suffered a capital loss 
the same way as it has decided the principal case. 
34. If this can be said to be an inequity, it is no more so than the inequity existing 
between persons selling their own homes for a gain and those selling for a loss. The 
selling expenses associated with selling a home may be used to offset the purchase 
price received in determining the amount of recognized gain on the transaction. 
On the other hand, although selling expenses will increase the amount of loss which 
may be sustained in selling the house, none of the loss is deductible under any section 
of the Code. 
35. Federal Income Tax Form 1040, Schedule D, Part I-Capital Assets, item 1-f. 
36. Even if selling expenses are thought of as being subtracted from the total 
receipts of the sale rather than as being added to the basis, it is arguable that the 
selling expenses do not become a part of any loss deduction. A loss is computed under 
§ 1001 by subtracting the amount realized on the sale from the adjusted basis of the 
property sold. Although the selling expenses may be used to determine the amount 
of the loss, § 1001 does not provide that this loss is deductible. The net loss, so com-
puted, will be allowed as a deduction in determining an individual's taxable income 
only if it meets the requirements of § 165(c). Thus, the selling expenses will merely 
become part of the net loss which, depending on the character of the loss, may or 
may not be taken as a deduction. 
